
















































































Artifacts and Fiat Objects: Two Families Apart?
Massimiliano Carrara and Marzia Soavi
Introduction
Fiat objects may come into existence by intentional explicit definition and 
convention or they can be the result of some spontaneous and unintentional 
activity resulting in tracing fiat spatial boundaries. Artifacts and fiat objects 
seem intuitively to be correlated: both artifacts and fiat objects depend for their 
existence on agents and their intentions. Is it possible to consider fiat objects as 
artifacts and to what extent? Or else can we conceive at least some artifacts as fiat 
objects? In order to draw a map of the possible answers to these two questions 
we will take into account various definitions of artifacts stemming from the two 
classical approaches: the intentional and the functional one.
We start our analysis by considering the following two questions:
Question (1): Is there a relation between being an artifact and being a fiat 
object or are they two completely independent notions?
In this first section of the chapter we adopt a sort of top–down approach; that is, 
we confront the two definitions associated with the general expressions ‘artifact’ 
and ‘fiat object’. We may cast the second question in the following form:
Question (2): Does being an artifact imply being a fiat object? And, 
conversely, does being a fiat object imply being an artifact?
Clearly, the bi-conditional expressed in question (2) is false in one direction: 
being an artifact does not imply being a fiat object. The other direction is instead 
much more interesting: in fact, it is debatable if being a fiat object implies being 
an artifact. We argue that the notion of ‘intentional production’ plays a crucial 
role in answering the question.
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In the second part of the chapter we consider a bottom–up approach: instead 
of considering the general definition of artifacts and fiat objects we will examine 
the possibility of a functional characterization of kinds of fiat objects in line with 
that of artifact kinds, hence the individuation of fiat objects through functional 
criteria.
By way of conclusion one could argue that even if artifacts and fiat objects 
are not strongly related as ontological categories, they are not two families 
apart: both kinds for fiat objects and artifact kinds can belong to the family of 
functional kinds.
Artifacts and fiat objects: A preliminary characterization
In this first section we start from a top–down approach, that is, we start by 
comparing the definitions of ‘artifact’ and ‘fiat object’. Where artifacts are 
concerned, we can isolate two key elements in the most discussed definitions 
in the philosophical literature: intentions and purpose or function. For example, 
Baker writes,
‘Artifacts are objects intentionally made to serve a given purpose’ (Baker 2007,  
p. 49; emphasis in the original). 
Hilpinen writes,
An artifact may be defined as an object that has been intentionally made for 
some purpose. (Hilpinen 2008, p. 1)
But what do we mean exactly by stating that artifacts are intentional products? 
On the one hand intentionality marks the intuitive − but as we will see misleading − 
distinction between artifacts and natural objects; on the other hand being an 
intentional product marks the difference between objects that are merely results 
of some intentional human action and objects that are the intended product of 
an action. To exemplify, pollution, crumbs, garbage and the greenhouse effect are 
all products of human intentional actions but for sure they are not the intended 
products of our actions. This is a crucial distinction in the literature concerning 
human action. Following a suggestion by Dipert (1993) we can label objects 
that are merely the result of human action: ‘artificial objects’. Thomasson (2003, 
p. 600) gives particular importance to this intentional character of the artifacts 
as products. In her perspective conditions for belonging to artifact kinds are 
the following:
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Necessarily, for all x and all artifactual kinds K, x is a K only if x is the product of 
a largely successful intention that (Kx), where one intends (Kx) only if one has 
a substantive concept of the nature of Ks that largely matches that of some group 
of prior makers of Ks (if there are any) and intends to realize that concept by 
imposing K-relevant features on the object. (Thomasson 2003, p. 600)
Casting aside the complexity of this definition, we can briefly say that a spoon is 
a spoon only if its author intended to produce a spoon, and was largely successful 
in producing it, and this is, in our view, exactly the condition for an object to 
be considered an intended product. If someone carves a spoon out of a piece of 
wood he will for sure leave on the working table a lot of scrap material, but this 
material is not to be considered an artifact but is something artificial, something 
that exists in consequence of human action. Indeed, it seems plausible to say that 
our intuition regarding ‘artificial’ includes under this label not only objects that 
are the products of human action but products that from a certain perspective 
we can consider as objects that would not exist without the intervention of 
human action, like scrap, the ozone layer hole, rise in sea levels and so forth. 
It is plausible to think that there is no clear-cut distinction between artifacts 
and artificial objects, nor between artificial and natural objects. This type of 
remark concerning the requirement of intentional production for artifacts will 
be central for evaluating fiat objects that don’t seem to be produced by the fiat of 
intentional decisions.
The second component of the definition, that of purpose or function, doesn’t 
play a fundamental role at the level of the general definition of the category of 
artifacts but, as we will see, it is central to the formulation of the conditions for 
being an artifact of a certain kind. So we will examine it in detail in the second 
part of the chapter, where we will adopt the bottom–up approach.
Consider now the term fiat object. In the following passage Smith and Varzi 
give a short and precise definition for fiat objects:
Once fiat boundaries have been recognized, it becomes clear that the bona 
fide–fiat opposition can be drawn not merely in relation to boundaries but 
in relation to objects also. Examples of bona fide objects are: John, the moon, 
a lump of cheese. Examples of fiat objects are: Dade County, the State of 
Wyoming, the North Sea. ... Broadly, it is the drawing of fiat outer boundaries 
in the spatial realm which yields fiat objects. (Varzi, Smith 2000, p. 403; 
emphasis mine)
Roughly, the idea is that if there are discontinuities in the material world 
corresponding to the external boundaries of an object, then the object is 
AQ: Please 
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bona fide, while if there are no such material discontinuities the boundaries 
of the object are fiat boundaries and the object is a fiat one. The boundaries 
of bona fide objects depend crucially on topological features of the material 
world (and if they are artifacts also on the intention of some agents), while 
the boundaries of fiat objects depend exclusively on the intentions of the 
agents but they are not arbitrarily drawn. In the most prototypical cases, fiat 
boundaries and hence fiat objects are created for very good reasons that can 
be of economic, political, social and cultural nature. In the words of Varzi 
and Smith,
Moreover, there are normally perfectly good reasons – reasons of topography, 
economy, or military strategy – why these and those fiat objects are created 
rather than others. Fiat objects thus owe their existence not exclusively to human 
fiat: real properties of the underlying factual material are involved also. (Varzi 
and Smith 2000, p. 403; emphasis mine)
Indeed, we are perfectly aware that the burden of the distinction is completely 
charged on the notion of physical discontinuity. There are many problems about 
strictly defining what a physical discontinuity is supposed to be, but in this work 
we take for granted that such a distinction can be traced in a relevant way. On 
this argument many interesting observations are made by Vogt.1
Casting aside the difficulties on clearly distinguishing fiat and bona fide 
objects we can say that in this top–down inquiry the answer to the first question, 
whether being an artifact implies being a fiat object, is obviously negative: there 
are a lot of artifacts that do not have fiat boundaries and so a lot of artifacts 
that are not fiat objects. The answer to the second one, whether being a fiat 
object implies being an artifact, is less straightforward and involves crucially the 
requirement of intentional production.
Comparing artifacts and fiat objects
We can be driven by our intuitions to believe that fiat objects are indeed artifacts 
basically because human intentionality is essentially involved in their coming 
into existence. Despite this belief the way we understand ‘production’ in the 
definition of artifacts plays a central role in two different respects:
1. To the extent that we have reasons to believe that the concept of ‘production’ 
involves the idea of some kind of physical or material modification, we have 
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reasons to exclude fiat objects from the category of artifacts: fiat objects 
are just produced by fiat. We can illustrate different reasons found in the 
literature to be more or less restrictive on the notion of production.
2. If we accept the distinction between artifacts and artificial objects described 
above and we see an artifact as the intended product of an intentional 
action, we might find that there are fiat objects that are not artifacts.
With regard to point 1, a quite intuitive approach would take production as 
an action involving some kind of material modification, but such a stance on 
production does not fit well with some intuitions we may have concerning 
artifacts as well. There are strong reasons for admitting abstract objects among 
artifacts; for example, if we choose certain metaphysical options, we may want 
to enumerate not only mathematical and logical proofs among artifacts but 
also words, pieces of music, scientific theories and even such social objects 
as institutions.2 Whether to include or exclude a requirement of material 
modification for intentional production depends on our preferences concerning 
the extent of the concept of artifact. Given this double possibility concerning 
the notion of production, it would be perfectly reasonable either to adopt a less 
restrictive notion of artifact including fiat objects or to opt for a more restrictive 
one, excluding fiat objects.
The conclusion that the relation between fiat objects and artifacts crucially 
depends on the more or less restrictive interpretation of the notion of ‘production’ 
is focused just on one of the components of the concept of artifact.
One further consideration on the general notion of artifacts may in fact lead 
us to reconsider question (2) from a quite different perspective (Does being 
an artifact imply being a fiat object? And, conversely, does being a fiat object 
imply being an artifact?) We can place in doubt the relevance of a category of 
artifact as classically defined by Baker and Hilpinen (see the above definitions). 
As a matter of fact such definitions impose very few restrictions on the type 
of objects that can figure as artifacts: in the end, the only restriction in place 
depends on the limits of our ability to produce something. This results in a 
hodgepodge class of objects with no relevant similarities that could help us in 
finding some common nature.
At this point we might be tempted to take into account as an alternative 
approach a naive functional characterization of artifacts, but what we obtain 
are some odd results, as Wiggins (2001, p. 87) observed. Take, for example, 
a functional characterization of a pen in terms of ‘any rigid ink-applying 
writing implement’, a clock in terms of ‘any time-keeping device’ and so forth. 
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Now, observe that it is part of our way of individuating artifacts to accept a 
vast range of possible changes in them – for example, parts replacement, 
dismantling, interruption of functioning and so forth – while leaving the 
identity of the artifact untouched. In the case of a damaged clock, in order 
to fix it we may send it to a watchmaker, who may stop it, open it and replace 
its damaged parts. The very same clock starts to function again. Hence one 
could argue that the principle of functioning is not related to the conditions 
of persistence for a clock. Moreover, the functional nature of an artifact is 
insufficient to specify any common properties in relation to objects belonging 
to the same artifact kind:
Clocks, for instance, may be made of a variety of different kinds of material and 
may function by radically different kinds of mechanisms and are collected up 
not by reference to a theoretically hypothesized inner constitution but under 
functional descriptions that have to be indifferent to specific constitution and 
particular mode of interaction with environment. (Wiggins 2001, p. 87)
Hence, the category so defined seems to be completely irrelevant from a 
metaphysical point of view or for any other theoretical interest one may have.
Before deriving a conclusion concerning the possibility for fiat objects to be 
considered a kind of artifacts let us examine point 2, concerning production. If 
artifacts are intended products of intentional action is it possible that there are 
fiat objects that are not the intended product of intentional action or even not 
the product of intentional action at all, that is, fiat objects that are not artifacts 
and not even artificial objects?
So it might be that the question of whether fiat objects are or are not a subclass 
of the class of artifacts so defined is not only ontologically uninteresting but also 
questionable. Can we conclude that they are two unrelated notions despite the 
fact that they have some point of similarity? Is there any further consideration 
we can do to tackle the problem of the relation between artifacts and fiat objects?
Artifacts and fiat objects: A bottom–up strategy
Our proposal is to adopt a different strategy for characterizing the relation 
between artifacts and fiat objects, a sort of bottom–up one. We start from some 
considerations concerning artifact kinds leaving in the background the general 
category of artifacts. We take into account different notions of artifact kinds, 
even if all of them developed around the notion of function. Broadly speaking 
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artifact kinds constitute a particular type of functional kinds, and we propose 
to treat kinds of fiat objects as functional kinds on par with artifact kinds. 
Functions are commonly recognized as the most adequate properties to be used 
for classifying and individuating artifacts. For example, we can say that given an 
object a at time t and an object b at time tʹ,
Identity criterion (IC): If a and b belong to a functional kind K, then a is the 
same as b iff there is a continuous material path between a and b and a and b are 
able to perform the same function.
The intuition behind IC is that the identity of an artifact is strongly connected 
with its ability to perform a certain function and the function gives the spatio-
temporal identity conditions of an artifact. We propose to consider a similar IC 
for fiat objects also. There are, as a matter of fact, a lot of fiat objects undoubtedly 
endowed with functional unity: chairs made of one piece of wood have fiat parts 
as legs, backs and seats that are functionally individuated. Other interesting 
examples can be taken from the biological domain: roots, trunk and leafs of 
a tree are all physically continuous to one another and so they are fiat objects, 
but are clearly functionally distinguished parts of the entire organism. The same 
can be concluded for many functional parts of other living organisms. It is 
interesting to note that Vogt (see Chapter 6 of this volume, p. xx) – as we have 
done – concludes that there are many fiat objects having functional unity, but, 
unlike our point of view, by exploiting an innovative characterization of bona 
fide objects he takes these to be not real fiat objects.
As regards the role of function as an essential feature of artifacts, it is 
important to notice that there are different conceptions of functions, and that 
they are differently applied to artifacts. Following Carrara and Vermaas (2009), 
it is possible to distinguish four conceptions of artifact function.
1. The designer/creator intentions account, in which the technical functions of 
an artifact are the capacities or goals for which agents designed the artifact.
  This is a position Philip Kitcher (1993) proposed. In the design view of 
function one holds that what defines an artifact a as an F is that a is a token 
of the designed artifact kind F.
2. The user intentions account, in which the technical functions of an artifact 
are the capacities or goals for which agents use the artifact.
  This so-called use view holds that what defines an artifact a as an F is that 
a is being, or could be, used as an F, irrespective of whether a was designed 
as an F in the first place. This conception of function has been proposed, for 
example, by Neander (1991) and McLaughlin (2001). Note that if one takes 
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the designer/creator of an artifact as one of its users, the use view may well 
subsume the designer/creator intentions account. It is a position Dennett, 
for example, considers when he says that ‘the inventor is just another 
user, only circumstantially and defeasibly privileged in his knowledge of 
the functions and uses of his device. If others can find better uses for it, 
his intentions, clear-headed or muddled, are of mere historical interest’ 
(Dennett 1990, p. 186).
3. The causal-role account, in which the functions of an artifact are the 
capacities by which it causally contributes to the capacities of larger and 
more complex systems (Cummins 1975).
  For example, the function of a carburettor is the capacity by which 
it causally contributes to the overall capacities of a car it is a part of. 
According to the original definition provided by Cummins, a function 
of a component is a certain kind of disposition to interact with the other 
components of a containing system so that it produces certain effects. The 
conception of dispositional property we intend to adopt then becomes 
crucial, because the category of fiat objects surely includes abstract 
entities. Cummins adopted a plain causal notion of disposition, and its 
functional analysis is meant to be a type of explanation that can be applied 
to a wide range of scientific disciplines: from physical to psychological and 
even social systems. The notion of disposition presupposes the notions 
of capacity and causal power and this might raise some problems to the 
extent that we admit abstract fiat objects; the same problem arises for 
artifacts as well.
4. The etiological account, in which the functions of an artifact are the 
capacities for which the artifact is reproduced in a long-term sense 
(Millikan 1984, 1993 and Preston 1998).
For example, the function of aspirin in the twentieth century was painkilling, 
because painkilling was the reason why aspirin was reproduced. Some supporters 
of the etiological account of functions, in particular Neander (1991), proposed 
inclusion of in the etiological characterization of function also the capacities 
for which artifacts are reproduced in a short-term sense. The stability and 
the historical persistence of fiat objects clearly suggests that they are actively 
maintained or reproduced by human community.
If this analysis ends positively, we can defend the thesis that, after all, there 
is some relevant similarity between artifacts belonging to functional kinds (of 
a certain type, the type depending on the notion of function adopted) and fiat 
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objects. This doesn’t allow us to give a straightforward positive answer to the 
second question of question (2) (Does being a fiat object imply being an artifact?) 
but we can say that both questions of question (2) (Does being an artifact imply 
being a fiat object? Does being a fiat object imply being an artifact?), even if 
natural and intuitive, are not useful in revealing important similarities between 
artifacts and fiat objects.
Benefits and costs of using functions for 
artifact and fiat object classification
One could argue that the above-described four options work differently as 
criteria for artifact classifications. In the following, we briefly examine the 
benefits and the costs of adopting each of them in turn as the basis for artifact 
classifications and then see if it is plausible to adopt each of them also for the 
classification of fiat objects.
The first two options deal with intentional notions of function and will be 
discussed here together. The attribution of function according to the designer or 
user intention can capture quite well many of our intuitions concerning artifact 
classifications. Some artifact kinds seem to bear in their names their functional 
nature: can opener, corkscrew, pencil sharpener and screwdriver are a few 
prominent examples. But, in fact, even for artifacts such as chairs, cars, phones 
and so forth, it seems intuitive to regard their nature as that of objects designed to 
perform a certain function. Nonetheless, there are two main problems regarding 
this option: firstly, functions commonly associated with kinds, such as chairs or 
cars, seem to be too loosely described for the individuation of artifacts of the 
same kind; secondly, we may have objects produced for a certain function that 
are – as a matter of fact – systematically used to perform a different function 
and in many circumstances we seem to favour a function attribution related to 
their use and not to their design. The result is that an object can be classified in 
different ways according to its different uses. Furthermore, if we try to define 
functional identity conditions associated with artifact kinds we obtain an 
ontology of very fragile artifacts that can jump in and out of existence whenever 
a new use is established for them.
Let us examine the first problem. Consider the first phone designed by 
Alexander Graham Bell and the later phones that succeeded it. On the designer 
intentions account of artifact functions the first telephone had the function of 
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aiding the hard-of-hearing, since history has it that Bell designed his original 
phone for that capacity. Later phones designed by Bell or by others were 
however designed for long-distance communication and thus have this type of 
communication as their function on the designer intentions account. The first 
phone is thus of a different functional kind from the successor phones. Given 
the later developments in telephone technology, the consequence is that Bell’s 
original phone and a modern twenty-first-century cellular phone are not of 
the same functional kind. Is this really a problem? Couldn’t it be acceptable to 
consider artifacts that we commonly classify as objects of the same functional 
kind as such even when in fact they are not? Might it not simply be that for our 
everyday communication we don’t need a fine-grained classification of artifacts? 
As soon as we move to a technical level we need a some more refined way of 
describing functions and it is at this level that we can find the tools for such 
a description. In some sense, we commonly misclassify artifacts, in the same 
way as we misclassify fruits and vegetables or stars and planets. The way an 
agent thinks of the artifact he is designing is for sure much richer than a simple 
description such as ‘keeping time’ for a watch or ‘sitting upon’ for a chair. As 
is well known, what is characteristic of functions is that they can be described 
at different levels of abstraction, from the more abstract with an input–output 
formulation to more detailed descriptions including elements of material 
constitution and functioning: the more abstract characterization of functions 
seems to be inadequate to describe the function intended by the designer. The 
price to be paid is that of regarding our common classifications of artifacts as in 
need of revision in favour of a more fine-grained and sophisticated classification. 
It seems to be a small price to pay, which simply places common functional 
kinds of artifacts on par with common kinds of natural objects: trees, stars, fruits 
and so forth are all commonly associated with criteria that we have no problem 
in discarding in favour of scientific ones.
The second problem, connected with the proposal of classifying artifacts 
according to their use, concerns essentially ontological benefits and costs. This 
problem leads us to connect directly with the discussion of the second criterion 
of function attribution mentioned. As a matter of fact no one has defended 
the general thesis that functions are attributed in relation to users’ intentions 
excluding the possibility of considering designers as users: all the more so if our 
objective is not that of resolving the general problem of function attribution to 
artifacts but that of merging it with the individuation of artifact kinds − objects 
would too easily change their kind. A chair would become all of a sudden a shelf 
BLO_12_NAO_C008_docbook_indd.indd   150 21-08-2018   13:46:38
151Artifacts and Fiat Objects
and then go back to being a chair even tens of times a day and this would sound 
as a weird classification already from a commonsensical point of view, but if we 
add the metaphysical requirement that criteria of classification are or give rise 
to criteria of individuation, then we would obtain a plethora of objects going 
in and out of existence too easily. There are no reasons in principle to think 
that such an option is impossible to defend; maybe someone could take such 
an inflationary ontology seriously. Of course, one may wonder what is exactly 
the notion of use at work here; probably a more manageable way to consider 
it is to understand ‘use’ as ‘standard use’ or ‘common use’. However, we are 
handling some very pre-theoretical and vague notions3 and their indeterminate 
nature does not allow us to arrive at a good standard criterion of classification 
for artifacts.
The user intention account is maybe the one that more easily can be 
applied to fiat objects as well: they are put to uses and their existence does 
not always start with any easily identifiable event that could demarcate their 
production. In this regard it seems obvious that a relevant distinction to make 
is that between institutional fiat objects and non-institutional fiat objects. 
While Italy may be regarded as a fiat object that originated on 17 March 1861, 
the northern hemisphere of Earth can be individuated as something with a 
geographical use but for sure it does not have any clear event that signals 
its origin.
We already remarked on the centrality of the notion of production for 
understanding the relation between artifacts and fiat objects but we placed in 
question only one aspect of the notion of production involved in the definition 
of artifacts, that of material modification; the other important aspect is that 
of intentionality. Production of an artifact might be a long-lasting process 
involving the action and thought of a lot of people, but it seems natural to 
attribute a crucial role to some final decision: something is intentionally 
produced if at a certain point the processes of production are deemed 
complete, and this can be the mark of intentional directedness of the process of 
production. To the contrary we think it is possible to leave open the possibility 
that fiat objects are created by habits and traditions and, even though these 
can be regarded as kinds of production processes, they are not intentionally 
directed processes. To accept a more liberal notion of production including 
collective and unintentional production is a strategy for treating both artifacts 
and fiat objects as objects produced by human agents and regarding their 
functions as those assigned by their users/makers. Nonetheless the attribution 
BLO_12_NAO_C008_docbook_indd.indd   151 21-08-2018   13:46:38
152 Natural and Artifactual Objects in Contemporary Metaphysics
of function in relation to this more liberal notion of production gives rise to an 
extravagant and inflated ontology, as we already mentioned at the end of the 
last paragraph.
As regards the third approach, the causal role account, its adoption for artifacts 
has one main consequence: in order to work out the criteria of classification 
we need to make reference to a containing system and a functional analysis. In 
the classification of parts of artifacts we need to appeal to a certain functional 
analysis of the object and for the classification of whole artifacts we need to 
consider some external system, typically the system of use, in order to evaluate 
the function and classify the object used. In such a perspective, the resulting 
classifications would be contextually dependent on the overall system referred 
to, and relative to the functional analysis adopted. Hence, causal role function 
doesn’t seem to be the best choice for a functional classification that could work 
as a taxonomy; nonetheless there seem to be no specific problems for fiat objects 
in this case.
In the fourth account – the etiological one – in order to obtain a functional 
criterion we need to supply an historical reconstruction of maintenance 
or (re-)production in which some particular properties of a given artifact 
play a distinctive causal role: such properties playing that role favour the 
re-production of objects of a certain type. Quite often an etiological account 
of function will involve a notion of copy; that is, the items with a certain 
function are reproduced in the sense that they are copies of other items of the 
same type. For artifacts it gives rise to some common problems concerning 
either the attribution of function to the first instances of a certain type, 
that is, instances that cannot be considered as the result of some history of 
maintenance, or re-production or else the possible shift in causal role. The first 
problem can be overcome by accepting that the first exemplars produced are 
part of a sort of mental history of maintenance4 or accepting a mixed criterion 
of function attribution. As regards the second one, consider again the case of 
aspirin (the example is taken from Houkes and Vermaas 2004). The aspirin 
produced during all of the first half of the twentieth century was intended to 
be a painkiller; only later, in the second half of the century, was its property 
as a blood-clot preventer discovered. In the etiological account, in which 
artifact functions are the capacities for which artifacts are re-produced, the 
first tablets had painkilling as their function. Indeed, at that time, painkilling 
was the known capacity of aspirin. A tablet of aspirin produced nowadays 
has both the function of painkilling and that of blood-clot prevention: this 
has generated a shift in how to classify aspirin. Shifts in classification are not 
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per se problematic but they have the undesirable consequence of allowing 
different kinds with the same name and with instances with the same physical 
structure.
Let us consider now fiat objects. Their existence depends on cognitive acts 
of agents intending to refer to portions of physically continuous objects. This 
intention is socially recognized and adopted and it gives rise to different types 
of convention. These are established for their practical utility but can persist 
even despite a complete lack of it. They persist as long as the conventions are 
active. Hence the most natural way of extending the etiological account to fiat 
objects is in relation to the production version of it: they come into existence 
in consequence of certain conventions and these fix their function. As a matter 
of fact the notion of re-production is sensitive to the same problems of the 
notion of production and also to further problems concerning the notion of 
a copy.
Conclusions
Our choice to compare artifacts and fiat objects was mainly motivated by the fact 
that both ontological categories involve a certain dependence of the existence 
and nature of the objects on human intentions. They seem to be two kindred 
ontological categories. We started from a classical top–down perspective 
analysing the main implications of their general definitions, but this survey didn’t 
give us any conclusive result: we simply noted that a certain problematic aspect 
in the general definition of artifacts – that is, if production involves material 
modification – is also crucial for the inclusion of fiat objects among artifacts. 
Some further considerations led us to question the ontological benefit of such an 
approach; it is evident, in fact, that a general definition of artifacts doesn’t lead 
to the individuation of a category of objects significantly similar to one another. 
We proposed then to shift to a different approach trying to consider fiat objects 
as well as artifacts as objects that are best classified according to their function, 
that is, objects that belong to functional kinds. Functional classifications depend 
on the criteria for function attribution we decide to adopt and so we briefly 
examined four different classical options. The aim of our analysis is not to 
give reasons to choose one among these options, but simply to give a critical 
assessment of each of them in order to give credibility to the idea that fiat objects 
might be considered objects belonging to functional kinds. Regarding artifacts 
we have few reasons to doubt that they are best viewed as items of functional 
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kinds and so a strict comparison between function attribution and classification 
of artifacts and function attribution and classification of fiat objects may lead to 
the adoption of a functional classification also for the latter.
Notes
1 On this see Chapter 6 of this volume, on granularity and frame of reference.
2 On words as artifacts see Chapter 9 of this volume.
3 For a more detailed analysis of the notion of use, see Houkes and Vermaas (2004).
4 See Millikan (1984), (1993).
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